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For most American citizens, interest in the presidential election
campaign of 2000 ended when the Supreme Court in Bush v Gore' re-
fused to allow any further recount of the Florida votes. After a short
flurry of heated debate over the soundness of the decision, the nation
buckled down to business as usual. The attention of the media was, to
say the least, short-lived. No longer did reporters seek out law profes-
sors to dissect past legal maneuvers and to predict future ones. Politi-
cal attention quickly turned to John Ashcroft, Linda Chavez, and Gale
Norton-all controversial Bush nominees for key cabinet positions.
The public seems not to be composed of legal purists. It expected
something ugly, and in a succession of divided opinions from the Flor-
ida and United States Supreme Courts, it got it. But resilience is the
mark of a nation that quickly shrugged off one bruising legal and po-
litical struggle only to begin a second, and a third, and ....
Constitutional law professors form a different breed, with longer
memories and deeper resentments. Although the short-term issue of
who counts as president has been resolved, letters and articles have
voiced with varying degrees of indignation a common theme that the
legitimacy of the Court has been effectively called into question by its
political coup d'6tat.2 The Court's decision in Bush v Gore has been
t James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago;
Peter and Kristin Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution.
1 121 S Ct 525 (2000) (per curiam).
2 See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, New Republic 18 (Dec 25,2000) (arguing that
the majority in Bush v Gore "have ... made it impossible for citizens of the United States to sus-
tain any kind of faith in the rule of law").
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regarded in many quarters as a travesty of constitutional law incapa-
ble of rational defense. Recently, for example, 585 law professors have
signed a public letter attacking a conservative and mean-spirited
Court for its devious and hypocritical judicial activism. It is difficult to
assess the potential influence of these harsh condemnations and dire
predictions on public opinion and the political process. But, as the bat-
tles over the Bork and Thomas nominations show, old wounds are eas-
ily reopened in confirmation hearings of presidential Supreme Court
nominees.
In this case, I think that overheated rhetoric has led to overstated
charges. It is for this reason that I shall mount a qualified rear-guard
defense of the outcome in Bush v Gore. I shall not do so on the equal
protection grounds that carried the day with the five conservative jus-
tices who voted to end the recount. Quite simply, I regard that argu-
ment as a confused nonstarter at best, which deserves much of the
scorn that has been heaped upon it. The same harsh judgment, how-
ever, cannot be made of the alternative ground for decision that was
championed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion joined
only by Justices Scalia and Thomas, which would have overturned the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court on the ground that its rulings
ran afoul of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution,
which provides that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature Thereof May Direct," the electors for the offices of Presi-
dent and Vice President. Unlike the equal protection phase of the
case, any evaluation of this claim requires us to analyze the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in relation to the two decisions of
the Florida Supreme Court in the post-election period.' Part I dis-
cusses the equal protection arguments. Part II is devoted to the less
conspicuous but more potent Article II argument.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM
Any equal protection challenge to the Florida recount procedure
quickly runs into insurmountable difficulties. The initial foray of the
U.S. Supreme Court's per curiam opinion was to note the start-and-
stop quality of the recount procedures throughout the state.! There
was wide variation in standards across counties that used the paper
3 See Dave Zweifel, Court Decision Still Rankles Law Profs, Cap Times 6A (Jan 24, 2001)
(reprinting text of ad).
4 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243 (Fla Dec 8,2000) (overturning trial judge; ordering immedi-
ate statewide recount of undervotes), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525; Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220 (Fla Nov 21,2000) (ruling that the Secretary of
State had to take late-submitted totals from canvassing boards), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
5 See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525.
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ballots with their now-infamous chads. There were also wide varia-
tions in standards over time within a single county: Palm Beach, for
example, had several different standards on the counting of chads,
which veered from narrow to broad and back again.6 There were also
allegations that the Democrats (and doubtless the Republicans)
placed pressure on the canvassing boards in Broward, Palm Beach,
and Miami-Dade Counties to expand the definition of what votes
could be counted.! None of the variations and switches that took place
in time could be easily justified by differences in local equipment or
local practices. There is also little doubt that uniformity in election
procedures is highly desirable as a minimum, noncontroversial condi-
tion for procedural fairness. Indeed, Florida law charges the Secretary
of State, as its chief election officer, with the responsibility to "[o]btain
and maintain uniformity in the application, operation and interpreta-
tion of the election laws."8
Even against this troublesome backdrop, the equal protection
claim runs into two serious challenges, one substantive and the other
remedial. First, why does the inconsistent administration of the Flor-
ida election laws amount to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause? Second, why, if such is the case, was it appropriate or neces-
sary to end the recount?
As to the first, there is an obvious gulf between the cases cited by
the Supreme Court majority and the unfortunate electoral situation as
it developed in Florida. Harper v Virginia Board of Elections' struck
down a poll tax of up to $1.50 on the ground that it amounted to an
implicit discrimination on account of wealth that bore no relation to
voting qualifications proper.' To be sure, no one can doubt that any
individual who cannot pay the tax is excluded from the polls. This free-
form decision, which self-consciously sought to distance itself from
Lochner v New York," was itself something of a stretch under classical
equal protection law given that a poll tax is facially neutral and, unlike
literacy tests, can be applied in a mechanical way that eliminates the
dangers of political discretion. At root it looks as though Harper rests
on the proposition that voting rights are so fundamental that they
6 See id at 531.
7 See Don Van Natta, Jr. and David Barstow, Counting the Vote: The Canvassing Boards:
Elections Officials Focus of Lobbying from Both Camps, NY Times Al (Nov 17,2000) (reporting
on pressure exerted on canvassing boards during the recount fight).
8 Fla Stat Ann § 97.012 (West 2000).
9 383 US 663 (1966).
10 Id at 666.
11 198 US 45 (1905) (ruling that a maximum hour law for bakers violated the Due Process
Clause), noted in Harper, 383 US at 669.
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cannot be abridged on account of wealth. Be that as it may, Harper has
scant relevance to the probity of Florida's recount procedures. It is
one thing to find a serious affront to equal protection from a wealth
test that is uniform in its application but disparate in its impact. It is
quite another to find an equal protection violation in a process that
does not take into account wealth (or for that matter, race) in deciding
what counts as a valid vote. In a word, the Florida scheme is devoid of
any suspect classification needed to trigger the equal protection analy-
sis.
Likewise, the per curiam citation to Reynolds v Sims" also runs
far afield. That case dealt with the refusal of state legislatures to reap-
portion themselves, in ways that perpetuated massive differences in
the size of legislative districts.'3 The obvious imbalance is that all indi-
viduals who reside in populous counties systematically have much less
political influence than their peers who reside in less populous coun-
ties. It is possible therefore to identify unambiguously the winners and
losers from the state practice, and to demand in principle at least some
justification for imbalances consciously perpetuated by the refusal of
the dominant legislative coalition to initiate electoral reforms that
would necessarily cut into its own power.
That situation bears scant resemblance to the Bush versus Gore
dispute, in which all Florida voters, no matter where they lived, had
equal say in the outcome of the election. No one in Florida practiced a
conscious manipulation of the voting standard that necessarily skews
the outcome in favor of one region, or even one group. To see why,
start with the simple but realistic assumption that the election features
only two candidates and that the winner is selected by a simple major-
ity vote, with one vote per person. Under these circumstances it is sen-
sible to treat the vote as though it were a share in some corporate en-
terprise, which is run by the party that commands just over 50 percent
of the vote. On this view, Harper makes it impossible to exclude
shareholders who cannot pay some minimum voting fee. Reynolds in
turn holds that one share of stock cannot have ten votes while another
share of stock only has one.
Bush v Gore, however, does not fall into either of these simple
patterns of electoral skewing for there is no conscious form of ex ante
discrimination. From the ex ante perspective no one can identify the
determinate class of individuals who benefit from or are burdened by
the choice of this or that standard for counting ballots. It is not as
though one standard was used for Gore voters and another for Bush
12 377 US 533 (1964) (upholding district court orders to reapportion both houses of the
Alabama legislature, noting that the failure to do so violated the Equal Protection Clause).
13 Id at 561-66.
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voters. It is thus no surprise that the per curiam opinion was unable to
explain why this asserted equal protection violation worked to Bush's
disadvantage. Here the key feature of any equal protection challenge
is that it takes no position on the proper standard for counting votes.
Rather, like any argument from distributive justice, it merely argues
that like cases (or votes) should be treated alike, but remains agnostic
on how any-indeed all-of these cases (or votes) ought to be
treated.' Hence, even if it were conceded that the disparities in the re-
count processes between counties and within counties were indefensi-
ble, the equal protection analysis only demands that these anomalies
be eliminated. But the equal protection critique offers no guidance as
to how that should be done.
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy (at least if time is no con-
straint) is to remand the case to the Florida courts to decide which
uniform standard should apply. At this point, Gore's prospects have to
improve. The Florida Supreme Court made painfully clear that it held
that the clear intention of the voter was the touchstone of Florida's
election law.'5 It takes little imagination to predict that, if it had been
forced to adopt a uniform standard for all punchcard ballots, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court could leap to that standard that maximized the
number of undervotes that were included in the final tally. It was not
just chance that Broward County had produced 567 net Gore votes
and Palm Beach County only around 200." No one could be certain
that this change in the rules of the game would have erased the slen-
der Bush advantage, but the recent reexamination of the ballots by the
Miami Herald suggests that Bush would have maintained his razor-
thin advantage to the bitter end, even if the ballots had been re-
counted under the standards enunciated by the Florida Supreme
Court.
14 For an early expression of this limited ideal, see Powell v Pennsylvania, 127 US 678,687
(1888) (ruling that state regulation of oleomargarine did not violate equal protection as it sub-
jected all in the business to the same regulations).
15 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220, 1238 (Fla Nov 21,
2000), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per
curiam).
16 The extent of the differences is captured in this measure of Gore Yield prepared by Pro-
fessor Jeffrey Milyo of the Harris School of Public Policy:
Gore Yield*
County Gore Yield (1% sample hand count) Gore Yield (hand count)
Miami-Dade: 4% 16% (partial)
Broward 1%* 8.5% (full)
Palm Beach 10%* 2% (full)
*estimated
The obvious liberalization in Miami-Dade and Broward magnified the swing.
"Gore Yield" = (net Gore votes added divided by undervotes manually counted).
The University of Chicago Law Review
The equal protection analysis thus does nothing to halt the re-
count process. What is needed is some anchor that locks the Florida
Supreme Court into choosing a more restrictive rule. That anchor was
available in Palm Beach County where the local rule stated: "A chad
that is fully attached, bearing only an indentation, should not be
counted as a vote."', Indeed, there was no evidence that any other
county in Florida had ever departed from that understanding. This an-
chor has two advantages. The first is that it offers a litmus test to de-
termine what counts as a valid vote: if the light shines through, then
the vote can count; otherwise it does not. The second is that the uni-
form past practice (especially in Palm Beach) resonates with the pow-
erful notion of fairness that holds that you cannot change the rules af-
ter the race has been run.
This last concern probably accounts for the belated and undevel-
oped reference to possible due process violations in the per curiam
opinion." That maneuver runs into the potential doctrinal obstacle
that a "vote" as such, notwithstanding its enormous institutional im-
portance, may not rank as either "liberty" or "property" that is cov-
ered by the Clause. (There is no similar restriction in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, which governs most voting cases.) Even the broad
definitions of liberty and property do not explicitly cover voting
rights." Yet on the other hand, so long as corporate shares, complete
with voting rights, count as property, then it may well make sense to
accept this broader reading here. Yet even this revised constitutional
theory calls for a remand to the Florida courts, albeit with somewhat
different instructions. Dimpled chads are out, and the Florida Su-
preme Court must run its recount under more restrictive rules. The
U.S. Supreme Court's per curiam opinion did not pursue this issue fur-
ther, but it segues neatly into the Article II issue to which I shall now
turn.
17 Guidelines on Ballots with Chads Not Completely Removed, Adopted by the November
6, 1990 Canvassing Board.
18 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 532.
19 See, for example, Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923). The Court described its concep-
tion of liberty:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the
term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id at 399. Those privileges generally did not include the right to vote. Likewise the right to vote
has not been included in the expanded list of property interests that have been protected under
the Due Process Clause. See, for example, Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 260-64 (1970) (using a
definition of property rights expansive enough to include the statutory right to welfare benefits).
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II. WHAT DID THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE DIRECT?
To the best of my knowledge no case, prior to Bush v Gore, had
passed on the proper interpretation of the Article II, Section 1, Clause
2 requirement that Florida shall "appoint" its presidential electors "In
such Manner as the [Florida] Legislature [ ] May Direct." That ques-
tion presumptively gives rise to many interpretive difficulties that
were not raised in this case. To mention just two, it is not clear whether
this provision requires that the "manner" for choosing electors be set-
tled before the election or whether it allows Florida to change its
mind after a popular election has been held but before the Electoral
College meets. It would, to say the least, be very disconcerting to know
that the Republican legislature could have voted to ignore the results
of the popular vote if Gore had carried the state by one million votes.
And if it could not intervene in that case, then could it intervene when
the popular vote is much closer?
For our purposes, however, these difficulties can be mercifully
skirted, because the root of the sensible challenge to the decisions of
the Florida Supreme Court rests on the argument that the litigation
phase of this election was not carried out in accordance with the sub-
stantive or procedural provisions of Florida's election law. To make
this argument successfully, it is necessary to surmount some major pit-
falls. Anyone who looks at this statute knows that it, like all complex
legislation, calls out for interpretation. Even though the responsibility
for interpretation is squarely given to the Secretary of State under the
Act," at some level, this task falls into the province of the courts. It
must therefore be shown, for there to be a violation of Article II, Sec-
tion 1, Clause 2, that the state court's interpretation does not fall
within the boundaries of acceptable interpretation, but rather repre-
sents what must be termed, for want of a better term, a gross deviation
from the scheme outlined in the statute. It should not be assumed,
however, that this standard means that gross deviations from the legis-
lative scheme can never be found so long as there are latent inconsis-
tencies within the statutory framework. The courts may rightly query
whether or not magenta counts as red, but they cannot do the same
20 This provision should be read in conjunction with Article I, § 4, cl 1: "The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." The most obvious contrast is that be-
tween "holding" elections and "appointing" electors. Does this preclude the use of popular elec-
tions to "appoint" electoral slates for the presidency? Even if it does not, it seems that parallel
concerns with federal judicial oversight in particular elections would apply here if the manner in
which an election is held deviates substantially from the legislative plan.
21 See Fla Stat Ann § 97.012, reproduced partially in text accompanying note 8.
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for green. Stated otherwise, the Florida Supreme Court can choose ei-
ther A or B when both are plausible readings, but cannot choose C,
which differs from both A and B, simply because it cannot decide be-
tween A and B. The size of the ambiguity limits the scope of judicial
discretion.
Second, it does not appear that any gross deviation from the Flor-
ida statutory scheme must be intentional. Article II, Section 1, Clause
2 reads like a strict liability provision. The Florida legislature directs
the manner in which the presidential electors are appointed, and all
other actors within the Florida system have to stay within the confines
of that directive. The word "direct" is a strong term whose sense is
captured in the phrase "directed verdict," which refuses to let a jury
stray beyond the area of permissible inferences.' It is not necessary
that one allege or establish systematic bad faith on the part of the
Florida Supreme Court to make the charge stick. It is only necessary
to show that the gross deviation has in fact taken place.
Third, this dispute is not governed by the usual rule that gives
state courts the last word on the interpretation of state law. That rule
makes perfectly good sense when the matter in question is one that
states regulate by virtue of their status as independent sovereigns
within a federal system. But in this case, the strong federal interest in
the selection of the President of the United States makes it appropri-
ate for federal courts to see that all state actors stay within the original
constitutional scheme. Given judicial review, the United States Su-
preme Court has the last word on whether any state has strayed from
its constitutional path in choosing its presidential electors. Surely, it
would raise a federal question if the Secretary of State decided, con-
trary to state statutes, to ignore the state election returns in authoriz-
ing the slate of state electors even if the state courts remained silent. If
therefore the state courts or state executive officials have failed prop-
erly to apply the state scheme, resulting in a gross deviation from the
legislature's directives, then a federal court can review the matter un-
der Article II.
Fourth, resort to Article II eliminates all doubts over the reme-
dial fit that plagues the Court's equal protection argument. Once it is
determined that the Florida Supreme Court has strayed from the leg-
islative scheme, then the United States Supreme Court has no obliga-
tion to remand the case for another round. Rather, it becomes per-
fectly sensible to let the Secretary of State's determination stand since
the Gore forces had not made any viable challenge to it.
22 See, for example, Quinton v Farmland Industries, Inc, 928 F2d 335, 338-39 (10th Cir
1991) (noting that a directed verdict is appropriate when "the evidence and permissible infer-
ences therefrom indicate that reasonable minds could not differ") (emphasis added).
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With these preliminaries out of the way, it now becomes possible
to identify some of the key mistakes of the Florida Supreme Court
that support the charge that it created its own electoral scheme that
substituted judicial authority for that of the Secretary of State. As an
overarching objective, the main mission of the election law is to ex-
pand the franchise so that all eligible voters who choose to exercise
their rights have a reliable means to do so. But an election code has to
contend with grubby realities as well as lofty aspirations. Hence it
must reconcile the desire for inclusion with the twin interests of final-
ity and probity. Elections must be decided quickly enough so that the
winners can prepare to assume public office. And the rules governing
elections must be tight enough to prevent the use of fraudulent prac-
tices-before, during, and after an election-that might alter an out-
come of an election for the worse. The key element in reading the
Florida Election Code therefore is to see how these three concerns
work themselves out in connection with particular statutory provi-
sions. In this case it is instructive to look at three particular points. The
first of these concerns the definition of what counts as an "error in the
vote tabulation."' The second concerns the dispute over the date at
which the local canvassing boards had to submit their tallies to the
Secretary of State. The third element concerns the relationship be-
tween the (initial) protest phase of the proceedings and the (subse-
quent) contest phase. On each of these points, the Florida Supreme
Court turned the original electoral system, as directed by the legisla-
ture, on its head.
A. Errors in Tabulation
The first question of note involves the conditions that must be
satisfied in order to have the hand recount that Gore requested. Here
the basic statutory provision states that if the manual recount indi-
cates an "error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome
of the election, the county canvassing board shall:
(a) Correct the error and recount the remaining precincts with
the vote tabulation system;
(b) Request the Department of State to verify the tabulation
software; or
(c) Manually recount all ballots."'
23 Fla Stat Ann § 102.166(5) (West 2000).
24 Id.
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The entire recount procedure is thus predicated on a determina-
tion of an error in vote tabulation. Unless that is shown, no hand re-
count is authorized at all. In dealing with this issue, the administrative
interpretation given to that phrase was that an "'error in the vote'
tabulation only means a counting error resulting from incorrect elec-
tion parameters or an error in the vote tabulating software."' The
Florida Supreme Court also recognized, in line with federal principles
16on this same subject, that it was bound to follow the interpretation
that the Division of Elections gave (which the Secretary of State fol-
lowed) to this phrase unless it constituted clear error, which it
promptly found:
The plain language of section 102.166(5) refers to an error in the
vote tabulation rather than the vote tabulation system. On its
face, the statute does not include any words of limitation; rather,
it provides a remedy for any type of mistake made in tabulating
ballots. The Legislature has utilized the phrase "vote tabulation
system" and "automatic tabulating equipment" in section 102.166
when it intended to refer to the voting system rather than the
vote count. Equating "vote tabulation" with "vote tabulation sys-
tem" obliterates the distinction created in section 102.166 by the
Legislature.27
This logic counts as pure sophistry, not plain meaning. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court drew a vacuous distinction between a vote tabula-
tion and a vote tabulation system, without explaining why it matters in
this case. At no point did it bother to offer any account as to the
meaning of the term "tabulation" as it appears in both phrases. The
clear sense of this term is captured in its dictionary definitions, which
refer to the organization of data in tables or other accessible form.8
That is exactly what the Secretary of State claimed. Her view allowed
corrections to the extent that there were errors in addition and compi-
lation; it also allowed correction to the extent that the tabulation sys-
tem operated defectively so as to generate the wrong results. There is
therefore perfectly good reason to use the phrase "automatic tabulat-
25 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220,1229 (Fla Nov 21, 2000)
(citing with disapproval the conclusion of the Division of Elections), vacd and remd as, Bush v
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
26 See, for example, Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US
837, 866 (1984) (ruling that federal courts must defer to an administrative agency's reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
27 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1229.
28 See, for example, the definition offered in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1199
(10th ed 1993) ("tabulate 1 : to put into tabular form 2 : to count, record, or list systematically."
"tabular ... 2 a : oft relating to, or arranged in a table; specif: to set up in rows and columns b
computed by means of a table.").
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ing equipment" in some portions of the statute but not in others. But
there is absolutely nothing in this provision that expands the word
"tabulating" so that the statute "provides a remedy for any type of
mistake made in tabulating ballots"-where the word tabulating no
longer has its original restrictive meaning, but now covers the separate
issue of standards: What counts as a valid vote?
The same point can be fortified when one looks at the three al-
ternative remedies that are allowed once the canvassing board finds
an error in tabulation. The first is that the errors that have been de-
tected can be corrected. The remainder of the precincts can then be
counted with the vote tabulation system in place.29 It seems quite clear
that the remedy in no way opens up the definitional question of what
counts as a valid vote because the recount relies on the same machine
reading used in the original counting process. The second remedy is
again focused on how the mechanical task of counting could have
gone awry, for it allows the canvassing board to ask the Department of
State to verify the tabulation software: This remedy does nothing
whatsoever to change the initial definition of what counts as a valid
vote. Its sole purpose is to debug the equipment used to tally votes.
All the action therefore swirls around the third option, which al-
lows the canvassing board, if it chooses, to recount all the ballots
manually.31 The conjunction that separates alternative (b) from alter-
native (c) is "or," and this suggests that the choice of remedies lies
within the sound discretion of the canvassing board, as the Florida
Supreme Court itself recognized.2 It defies comprehension, however,
that the local canvassing board should have the power to make or
break any candidate based simply on its choice among these three re-
medial options. The obvious structure of the entire provision is that
the three remedies are in pari materia. They are all directed toward
the same end-the correction of errors in tabulation that arise from
either human or machine error. That program can be implemented
only if the definition of a properly cast ballot does not vary with the
method the canvassing board chooses to rectify the error in tabula-
tion. On this view, the sole function of the hand recount is to examine
ballots to see whether they meet the standards for a ballot that is ma-
chine readable.
At this point, the functions of the hand recount should be limited
to two kinds of situations. The first is whether the chad has been so al-
29 See Fla Stat Ann § 102.166(5)(a).
30 See id § 102.166(5)(b).
31 See id § 102.166(5)(c).
32 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1229.
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tered that it allows the passage of light through the opening. This test
does not count dimpled chads, but counts partially hanging chads that
have been displaced sufficiently to allow the light to shine through-
the implicit requirement in the 1990 Palm Beach rule.33 This test might
have also been stretched (as had never been the case in Florida) to
count some dimples on evidence of equipment malfunction that pre-
vented the stylus from working-of which it appears that there was
none. A minimum condition for that approach is for the dimples to
appear in a consistent fashion across the face of the ballot in which
few, if any, of the chads are punched clear through. Under these cir-
cumstances, the argument can be made that the equipment failed to
register votes whose intention can be discerned from the pattern of
dimples that replicate the outcomes that are found in ballots that have
been cleanly punched. But, to repeat, this conclusion is far from self-
evident in the absence of some evidence of any systemwide failure of
the ballot equipment. It is therefore a close question as to whether
these "definite dimples in a coherent pattern" should count as errors
in tabulation.
It is at this point that the distribution of powers between the Sec-
retary of State, with her statutory responsibility for "interpretation" of
the election law," and the Florida Supreme Court comes into tension.
Both the meaning of "tabulating" as well as the structure of the stat-
ute's remedial provisions wholly undermine the claim of the Florida
Supreme Court that "the plain meaning" of the statute is such to allow
a hand recount to take place under conditions in which dimples shall
count, or at least be "considered," no matter what the condition of the
voting machinery. The opposite conclusion more accurately captures
the sense of the law. It thus counts as clear error to authorize the local
canvassing boards to use a manual recount to remedy an "error in
vote tabulation" as a pretext for adopting a broader definition of what
counts as a valid vote. That decision belongs to the Secretary of State
in her oversight function, not to the local canvassing boards, and not
to the Florida courts.
The Florida Supreme Court sought to overcome the weight of the
statutory language by noting the importance of guarding against error:
Although error cannot be completely eliminated in any tabula-
tion of the ballots, our society has not yet gone so far as to place
blind faith in machines. In almost all endeavors, including elec-
33 Guidelines on Ballots with Chads Not Completely Removed (cited in note 17).
34 See Gore v Harris, 2000 WL 1790621, *3 (Fla Cir Ct Dec 3) (Sauls) (notice the lack of
evidence of irregularity), revd and remd as Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd as
Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525.
35 See Fla Stat Ann § 97.012.
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tions, humans routinely correct the errors of machines. For this
very reason Florida law provides a human check on both the
malfunction of tabulation equipment and error in failing to accu-
rately count the ballots.6
But once again this represents a complete misapprehension of
how voting laws, and machines, work in Florida and elsewhere. The
reason we have machine counts is to guard against the risk of human
error and bias. The Florida Court thus wholly misstates the basic posi-
tion by blithely assuming that it is possible to correct one type of error
without introducing a second kind of error. The restricted types of re-
view noted above constitute a sensible effort to take both human and
machine error into account, and to guard against the possibility that
zealous supporters of a given candidate or cause will invent votes
where none exist.37 A litmus test is not an impediment to justice but a
bulwark against fraud. Watching election judges with political connec-
tions search for scratch marks on ballots is a somber reminder that
both kinds of error exist.
This reticence to rely on dimples is, moreover, ironically sup-
ported by the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Pullen v Mulligan,
38
which the Florida Supreme Court cited to support its own expansive
views. In Pullen the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:
To invalidate a ballot which clearly reflects the voter's intent,
simply because a machine cannot read it, would subordinate sub-
stance to form and promote the means at the expense of the end.
The voters here did everything which the Election Code requires
when they punched the appropriate chad with the stylus. These
voters should not be disfranchised where their intent may be as-
certained with reasonable certainty, simply because the chad they
punched did not completely dislodge from the ballot. Such a fail-
ure may be attributable to the fault of the election authorities, for
failing to provide properly perforated paper, or it may be the re-
sult of the voter's disability or inadvertence. Whatever the rea-
son, where the intention of the voter can be fairly and satisfacto-
rily ascertained, that intention should be given effect.
36 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1229-30.
37 On the risks, see Philip R. O'Connor, Democrats Hand-Count Gamble Un-American,
Chi Trib 23 (Nov 22, 2000) (noting the risk of human bias: "Machines don't have agendas. Hu-
mans do. Machines are honest.").
38 138 Ill 2d 21,561 NE2d 585 (1990).
39 Id at 611 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). "Did not completely" means "partially."
The University of Chicago Law Review
As a subsequent story in the Chicago Tribune reports,4' this rheto-
ric did not cash out as a license for local boards to use whatever stan-
dards they chose in running the hand count. Rather, the hand count
was done by shining lights through the ballot to see whether a human
eye could pick up a beam of light that the machine might have
missed.4 Dimples, even definite dimples, were not counted, doubtless
because of the risk of fraud and abuse of discretion that such a nebu-
lous standard introduces. To my knowledge, there has never been an
election in Florida in which dimples were counted as votes, given the
need for some objective verification of the intention of a voter who
can testify as to what he or she meant. On the merits therefore the
Secretary of State relied on a far sounder interpretation of Florida law
than did the Florida Supreme Court. If so, then the Florida Supreme
Court abused its discretion in overriding the interpretation on which
she relied with its own.
B. The Cutoff Date
The second bone of contention in the first Florida Supreme Court
case was whether the Secretary of State had discretion not to accept
tallies from the various counties more than a week after the election.
As a matter of administrative prudence, I think that it is clear that she
made the wrong choice in cutting off the recount so precipitously.
What she should have done in my view was to extend the period for
the count while insisting on a standard of interpretation that pre-
cluded the use of the dimples, which was well within her discretion.
But be that as it may, the question here is not whether she made the
best possible choice, but whether she acted within the limits of her
delegated powers. On this point the two key statutory provisions leave
much to be desired. Section 102.111, which deals with the position of
the Elections Canvassing Commission, provides:
If the county returns are not received by the Department of State
by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an election, all missing
counties shall be ignored, and the results shown by the returns on
file shall be certified .
40 Jan Crawford Greenburg and Dan Mihalopoulos, Bush Turns to Top US. Court: Republi-
can Wants Florida's Manual Recount Stopped: Illinois Case Offers Shaky Precedent, Chi Trib 1
(Nov 23, 2000) (noting that "the Illinois court actually affirmed a trial judge's order to exclude
dented ballots, since he had decided he could not reasonably determine the voters' will by
examining the ballots").
41 "[Circuit Court Judge Francis] Barth counted most of the ballots that had been perfo-
rated enough for light to shine through them, even if the paper tag known as a chad had not
fallen out." Id.
42 Fla Stat Ann § 102.111(1) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
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Thereafter Section 102.112 picks up the thread under the heading
"Deadline for submission of county returns to the Department of
State; penalties." It provides:
If the returns are not received by the department by the time
specified, such returns may be ignored and the results on file at
that time may be certified by the department.3
As the italicized words make clear, no one can doubt the conflict
between these two sections. Section 102.111 is badly drafted because it
seems to direct that all returns shall, in other words, must, be ignored
if they are submitted after the seven-day period: nothing can be done
to resurrect them. But if the returns are a dead letter, then it makes no
sense to say in the next section that the Secretary of State may ignore
them: for if she may ignore them, then she may also take them into ac-
count. In addition, to read the "shall" in Section 102.111 to control the
"may" in Section 102.112 renders otiose and superfluous the penalties
that the Secretary of State is empowered to impose on tardy local can-
vassing officials.
It is therefore incumbent to make some adjustment in the statu-
tory language for the provisions to harmonize with each other. Truth
be known that is not difficult to do. All that is required is to read the
"shall" language so that it does not refer to the status of the late re-
turns, but to the duty of the canvassing boards. The provision works, as
it were, in personam and not in rem. The local canvassing officials are
under a duty to submit the returns within the week under Section
102.111, but the Secretary of State has the power to extend that dead-
line if she so chooses, under, of course, the usual abuse of discretion
standard that governs administrative officers generally. The upshot is
that the local boards have a week to conduct a recount-no questions
asked. But once they wish to go beyond that, then they must persuade
the Secretary of State, who oversees the statewide process, to agree.
Unfortunately, at no point does the Florida Supreme Court
acknowledge this obvious way to break the impasse. Instead it trots
out every conceivable canon of statutory interpretation to
conclude that, consistent with the Florida election scheme, the
Secretary may reject a Board's amended returns only if the re-
turns are submitted so late that their inclusion will preclude a
candidate from contesting the certification or preclude Florida's
voters from participating fully in the federal electoral process.
43 Id § 102.112(1) (emphasis added).
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The Secretary in the present case has made no claim that either
of these conditions apply at this point in time.'
This order has no textual base whatsoever and it bears no relationship
to either of the two sections that spawned the conflict in the first
place. Surely, the Florida Supreme Court could not have defended its
reading if Section 102.111 had been drafted to say, "The Canvassing
Boards are under a Duty to Submit Returns within one week after the
election unless this obligation is waived by the Secretary of State." By
going far afield, the Florida Supreme Court invents its own standard
that takes all the discretion away from the Secretary of State and puts
her in a position where she must accept hand recounts completed after
the statutory cutoff date so long as it remains possible to raise a con-
test, which is itself an odd rule given the inherent uncertainty over
how long that contest might last. Yet even after this raw assumption of
power, the court went further, taking it upon itself to determine when
the protest phase of the electoral challenge is over. Here the Florida
Supreme Court holds that it "must invoke the equitable powers of this
Court to fashion a remedy that will allow a fair and expeditious reso-
lution of the questions presented here.,4' The bottom line was 5:00
p.m. on Sunday, November 26, 2000. But this assertion of "equitable
jurisdiction" has no textual referent: it looks like a fig leaf for judicial
legislation, pure and simple.
In stressing this point, it is critical to note that "equitable jurisdic-
tion" is not some formless field that gives all courts an implicit license
to do as they please.4 Traditionally, cases of equitable jurisdiction have
been defined by the remedy afforded: damages were the province of
the common law; specific performance, injunctions, foreclosure, and
the like were equitable remedies that historically set out the scope of
the Chancellor's jurisdiction. There is no question that equitable
remedies could often be flexible; multiple parties were often involved,
and remedies that operated on a defendant had to take into account
their interests.4 But by the same token equitable jurisdiction has never
left courts with unchartered discretion to do what they choose: rather,
it was constrained by its own set of rules, and I am aware of no general
principle of equity that would allow a court to ride roughshod over a
44 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220, 1239 (Fla Nov 21,2000),
vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per cu-
riam).
45 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d at 1240.
46 For the general principle, see Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405,416-17 (1975)
("That the court's discretion is equitable in nature hardly means that it is unfettered by meaning-
ful standards or shielded from thorough appellate review.") (citations omitted).
47 For a general discussion, see FW. Maitland, Equity:A Course of Lectures (Cambridge 2d
ed 1949) (revised by John Brunyate), in particular Lectures 1 and 2 (discussing the history and
nature of courts of equity, particularly in England).
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particular time limitation contained in a statute in favor of its own al-
ternative date.' This is not a case where a court of equity invokes a
principle of laches for an equitable cause of action in the absence of
any specific time limitation. Nor is it even a case in which statutes of
limitations are tolled to take into account specific disabilities of par-
ticular plaintiffs.
The reliance on equitable jurisdiction is a fig leaf, pure and sim-
ple, which allowed the Florida Supreme Court to impose its will on a
Secretary of State who thought otherwise. The transfer of this power
of discretion counts as arrogation by the judicial branch of powers re-
served to the executive branch by statute. Had her decision been re-
spected, the protest phase of this case would have ended as of No-
vember 14, 2000, and, as will become clear, her orders would have
been immune from challenge. It makes good sense for the United
States Supreme Court to enforce the result as of that date as the out-
come that the legislature, by its articulation of general rules and its
vesting of discretion in the Secretary of State, had directed.
C. Protest versus Contest
The last feature of the Florida decisions that requires some com-
ment concerns the relationship between the protest and contest
phases of an election dispute. The protest phase, which has already
been discussed, is directed toward the selection of administrative
remedies prior to the certification of the election result by the Secre-
tary of State. These remedies operate in much the same fashion as the
initial administrative conduct of the election.49 The contest phase be-
gins only after the protest phase is over. Under Florida law the
grounds for a contest after certification cover, in addition to issues of
fraud, bribery, and eligibility, these two heads:
(c) Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number
of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of
the election.
48 See, for example, Cope v Anderson, 331 US 461, 463-64 (1947) (noting that the same
statute of limitations applies to legal and equitable remedies for the same underlying wrong). For
a more general discussion, see Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materi-
als 931-34 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1994) (discussing interrelation between statutes of limitation and
laches).
49 The rules are contained in Fla Stat Ann § 102.168 (West 2000), enacted in 2000. The de-
tailed rules governing these election contests are set out in Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243,1253 n 4
(Fla Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 525.
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(e) Any other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show
that a person other than the successful candidate was the person
duly nominated or elected to the office in question or that the
outcome of the election on a question submitted by referendum
was contrary to the result declared by the canvassing board or
election board."0
Once some violation of the statute has been found, the statute pro-
vides:
(8) The circuit judge to whom the contest is presented may fash-
ion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each
allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked,
to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief
appropriate under such circumstances."
Two features about the contest phase deserve immediate atten-
tion. The first is that one has contests about protests, so that the issues
raised at the second phase are efforts to overturn incorrect decisions
at the protest phase. It makes no sense to read the statute as though
the contest phase is wholly unconnected with anything that went on at
the protest stage. If so, then there is no need to bother to wait until the
protest is over for the contest to begin. The second key feature is that
the statute contemplates a judicial trial, not administrative action, at
the contest phase. The minimum due process requirements of a trial in
turn make it imperative that each party have the chance to raise the
issues that it thinks appropriate, to present evidence to advance that
contention, and to rebut contentions and evidence presented by the
other side. Any sensible reading of the Florida statute seems to re-
quire that these elements be observed. The broad power of the circuit
judge to issue orders that "each allegation in the complaint [be] inves-
tigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged
wrong,"2 surely means to give a broad scope to discovery in cases of
this sort. But these provisions do not do away with the other elements
of a trial, including the orderly presentation of evidence, under the
usual rules of admissibility and cross-examination, before the court for
its decision.
The order issued by the Florida Supreme Court did nothing to re-
spect either of these key structural features about the relationship be-
tween these two phases of an integrated process. The threshold issue
in its deliberation was to determine the standard of review that should
be used during the contest phase. The statute itself is silent on the
50 Fla Stat Ann § 102.168(3)(c)-(e).
51 Id § 102.168(8).
52 Id.
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standard of review that the circuit court in an election contest should
apply to the administrative results of the protest phase. Yet the Florida
case law has read Florida law as calling for the abuse of discretion
standard that Judge Sauls had applied, most recently in its first foray
into this dispute.3
The internal logic of the Florida statute strongly confirms that
this review should be done, as is the case with other administrative ac-
tions, under an abuse of discretion standard. After all, the initial stat-
ute gives the canvassing board the initial choice over the method that
it wishes to use to correct errors in tabulation brought to light in the
protest phase. Indeed in its first decision, the Florida Supreme Court
stressed the word "or" in the choice of remedies. It seems odd in the
extreme to reverse fields and now hold that the original protest was
little more than a preliminary canter, so that the disappointed party
can relitigate on demand in the contest phase all matters in the case
solely on the assertion that the undervote had not been properly
counted.
Once it chose the de novo review standard, the Florida Supreme
Court simply took over the entire administration of the election chal-
lenge, trespassing on the functions allocated to either the canvassing
boards or the Secretary of State. Thus the Florida Supreme Court took
it upon itself to order a statewide recount of the undervote (but not
the overvote). Yet it nowhere explained where it received the power
to make (as an appellate court no less) an order that neither side had
requested. In support of its decision, it emphasized the words "investi-
gated, examined, or checked," and it acted as though the prior referent
to the "each allegation contained in the complaint" did not limit their
scope.5 Trials do not allow an appellate court o set for itself the pa-
rameters of the initial complaint, and neither Gore nor Bush asked for
a statewide recount. The Florida Supreme Court made a unilateral de-
cision to order a statewide recount, which flies in the face of the struc-
ture of the statute, which conducts protests on a county-by-county
level only, and which leaves it to the parties to determine the scope of
any contest that they might wish to raise if they are disappointed with
53 See Broward County Canvassing Board v Hogan, 607 S2d 508, 510 (Fla Dist Ct App
1992) (ruling that county canvassing boards had discretion to order or not to order a hand re-
count), quoted in Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1265 (Wells dissenting):
Although section 102.168 grants the right of contest, it does not change the discretionary
aspect of the review procedures outlined in section 102.166. The statute clearly leaves the
decision whether or not to hold a manual recount of the votes as a matter to be decided
within the discretion of the canvassing board.
54 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1262.
55 Idat 1261.
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the outcome of the protest phase. It is hard to see how any remedy
that goes beyond the boundaries of the complaint could count as "ap-
propriate" for a judicial proceeding, even if the other requisites for a
full-fledged contest had been satisfied, which, as noted above, they
were not.
In order to secure this result, the Florida Court did not give due
weight to the statutory words "rejection" and "legal." It wrote
that a legal vote is one in which there is a "clear indication of the
intent of the voter." We next address whether the term "rejec-
tion" used in section 102.168(3)(c) includes instances where the
County Canvassing Board has not counted legal votes. Looking
at the statutory scheme as a whole, it appears that the term "re-
jected" does encompass votes that may exist but have not been
counted.56
This reading makes it appear as though voter failure is tantamount to
official misconduct. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "Florida statu-
tory law cannot reasonably be thought to require the counting of im-
properly marked ballots."57 If the Florida legislature wanted to make
the failure to ascertain the intention of the voter the standard for trig-
gering a contest, it could have done so in just those words. But what it
did do was to treat the exclusion of legally-cast ballots on a par with
the inclusion of illegal ballots (for example, prisoner votes). A more
sensible reading indicates that this provision is directed at local elec-
tion officials who rejected, that is refused to accept or to count, votes
that were properly cast. The image connoted is a blockade of legal vot-
ers from the polls. The paired use of the terms "legal" and "illegal" is
designed to catch cases of misconduct of electoral officials, which is just
not involved here. The section reads on a par with the provisions that
allow contests over the question of candidate eligibility, fraud, and
bribery." It does not invite any decision not to count those ballots that
do not meet the standards for validity that were set out in the election
procedures themselves and then communicated clearly to voters.
In sum, then, Chief Justice Rehnquist draws blood when he
writes: "It is inconceivable that what constitutes a vote that must be
counted under the 'error in the vote tabulation' language of the pro-
test phase is different from what constitutes a vote that must be
counted under the 'legal votes' language of the contest phase."'9 The
two sections cannot be read to use standards that are in flat contradic-
tion with each other. Nor is the situation salvaged by appealing to Sec-
56 Id at 1257.
57 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 537 (Rehnquist concurring).
58 See Fla Stat Ann § 102.168(3)(a)-(b).
59 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 537 n 4 (Rehnquist concurring).
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tion 102.168(e), for the cause to be shown can only be the failure to
adopt a broader definition of a countable ballot than that applicable
in the protest phase, which makes no more sense here than it does
with Section 102.168(e). Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court,
once again, was happy to proceed simply on a showing that dimples
were not counted on ballots somewhere inside the state, wholly with-
out any showing of machine failure or electoral irregularity. 
°
This illicit expansion of the statutory grounds for a contest seems
pretty clear. What is worse is that the maneuver wholly precludes the
articulation of any coherent grounds to relate the protest to the con-
test provisions, even though the statutory scheme contemplates that
the contest should be to review the protest stage, and commence
within five days after it is finished." But the difference matters. Given
that an election contest is a trial, the Florida Supreme Court cannot
simply conclude without a trial that the Broward County manual re-
count was correctly done. If it is appropriate in a de novo proceeding
(assuming that was allowed under the statute) to count votes that
have not been punched as required, then that de novo review cannot
be selectively invoked, but must apply to all phases of the case. It is
therefore wholly improper at the contest phase not to allow Bush to
move-or indeed to raise the issue on its own motion-to exclude
dimpled ballots on the grounds that they manifested no clear inten-
tion at all. The dual standard is not acceptable. The pro-Bush findings
by the local canvassing boards were subject to de novo review. The
pro-Gore findings were treated as res judicata.
The utter lack of any sense of continuity between protest and
contest was only magnified by the Florida Supreme Court's treatment
of the Miami-Dade decision not to continue the recount of the under-
vote when it decided that it could not do so accurately before the No-
vember 26, 2000, deadline set by the Florida Supreme Court. The en-
tire thrust of the first Florida Supreme Court decision was to hold that
the discretion in the protest phase rested with the canvassing boards
even after the seven-day deadline of November 14, 2000, had passed.
But once this Canvassing Board decided that it could not recount all
the ballots (as Section 102.166(5)(c) required), then its discretion van-
ished in favor of an obligation to recount all ballots even after the
60 This point is repeatedly stressed in the dissent of Wells, C.J., see Gore v Harris, 772 S2d
at 1263-64.
61 A party that wants to raise a contest must file a complaint "within 5 days after midnight
of the date the last county canvassing board empowered to canvass the returns certifies the re-
sults of that particular election following a protest pursuant o s. 102.166(1)." Fla Stat Ann
§ 102.168(2), relied on in Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1270 (Wells dissenting).
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court-imposed November 26, 2000, deadline.62 That overlap in proc-
esses makes it quite clear that what happens here is not an orderly
progression between protest and contest, where the grounds of the
contest are necessarily more limited than choices available in the pro-
test stage. Rather, the entire statutory scheme is transmuted into one
long recount that in the end was entrusted to the trial judge of Leon
County, who was asked to assemble personnel to continue the recount
on a statewide level, thereby assuming all the functions vested by stat-
ute in the Secretary of State. At this point, it seems clear that Chief
Justice Rehnquist has it exactly right when he writes of the various
maneuvers of the Florida Supreme Court:
Underlying the extension of the certification deadline and the
shortchanging of the contest period was, presumably, the clear
implication that certification was a matter of significance: The
certified winner would enjoy presumptive validity, making a con-
test proceeding by the losing candidate an uphill battle. In its lat-
est opinion, however, the court empties certification of virtually
all legal consequence during the contest, and in doing so departs
from the provisions enacted by the Florida Legislature.6'
CONCLUSION
In sum, there is ample reason to believe, as the Rehnquist concur-
rence in Bush v Gore urges, that the Florida Supreme Court adopted,
under the guise of interpretation, a scheme for conducting election
challenges that deviates markedly from that which the Florida legisla-
ture had set out in its statutes. I have tried to indicate the multiple
ways in which the Florida Court did violence to the state statutory
scheme. To many modern mainstream constitutional scholars that
conclusion might seem harsh because they find it hard to accept that
weighty matters of constitutional interpretation do have right, and
hence wrong, answers that can be gathered from a close examination
of text, structure, and function. But accepting that view of pervasive
skepticism disables them from intelligent criticism of the United
States Supreme Court. If, conceptually, the Florida Supreme Court
could not cross an imaginary line, then neither could the United States
Supreme Court. If constitutional law is politics by another name, then
it makes no more sense to condemn the United States Supreme Court
for its political predilections than it does to condemn the Florida Su-
preme Court for its. All is politics and in that world rank alone be-
comes the sole arbiter of truth.
62 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1257-59.
63 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 536-37 (Rehnquist concurring).
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Effective criticism of the United States Supreme Court necessar-
ily depends, then, on a view of language that allows for us to recognize
that legal interpretation at any level could be wrong, indeed so wrong
as to count as an abuse of discretion for partisan political ends. I think
that charges of serious conceptual error do have a lot of force in deal-
ing with the equal protection argument that five members of the
United States Supreme Court found decisive. But by the same token, I
hope that I have said enough to show that the alternative Article II
argument has far more traction in light of what I regard to be the
manifest errors in the Florida Supreme Court's decisions. Quite sim-
ply, if the canvassing boards and the Secretary of State did not abuse
their discretion, then it seems as though the Florida Supreme Court
abused its. And if it abused its discretion, then the United States Su-
preme Court did not abuse its.
Any Article II attack on the decision of the Florida Court would
itself be quite unintelligible if statutory text did not limit, and limit
sharply, the range of interpretive options open to a court. But so long
as we can maintain the conceptual line between interpretation and
legislation, then we must recognize that it is always possible for any
court, at any level, to stray over that line so that its decrees can be re-
garded as judicial legislation. It is, to say the least, a regrettable truth
that the outcome of a presidential election necessarily turns on a ques-
tion of degree, by asking just how wrong is wrong enough to topple
the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. But the peculiar determi-
nation to override at various times the decisions of Florida's canvass-
ing boards, Secretary of State, and circuit court judges crosses that line.
Thus this tortured case draws to a close. It is tragic that on mat-
ters of this moment, no one can offer a mathematical demonstration
of whether the mistakes of the Florida Supreme Court were large
enough to constitute a gross deviation from the Florida statutory
scheme, as I believe that they were. But even that uncertainty should
prompt the outspoken critics of the United States Supreme Court to
reign in their indignation a little bit. After all, in order to reach that
conclusion, one has to think that the United States Supreme Court
committed clear error in its decision. But owing to the sorry perform-
ance of the Florida Supreme Court, that conclusion cannot be main-
tained, which I think is why the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion was greeted generally with widespread relief and not widespread
protest. In the end it is regrettable, but true, that the all-or-nothing
choice of the President of the United States could rest on what is in
the end a question of degree, as so many vital questions are. Such is
the way of the world, and it will not do to rail against it.

